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The upgrading of the European Commission and the European Parliament’s role in the EU 
policy-process from 1999 might have been expected to herald a shift away from the previous 
security- and control-orientation of asylum policy. No such shift occurred. This paper traces 
the continuity in EU asylum policy’s trajectory to the continuity in its ‘policy-image’: actors 
seeking to fashion institutional environments in which they can more effectively pursue their 
preferences can facilitate institutional change by shifting the ‘image’ of a policy – in other 
words, they can highlight new or neglected problems related to that policy, creating broader 
pressure for these to be dealt with by new actors in new venues. We disaggregate policy-
images into two elements: an element justifying an actor’s presence and function in policy-
making, and an element justifying the pursuit of its substantive preferences. We argue that 
institutional change laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam was facilitated by a policy-image 
that lacked the latter element. The newly empowered actors have subsequently struggled to 
assert their substantive preferences despite their institutional upgrade. 
 
 
Change and continuity in European asylum policy 
With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), the EU’s asylum policy might have been 
expected to shift away from its previous control- and security-orientation: although still dominated by 
the national interior ministry actors which had been the driving forces behind a security-centric – or 
‘securitarian’ – policy since the inception of cooperation, the institutional framework introduced by 
the Treaty formally boosted the power of the European Commission and European Parliament (EP). 
Yet, any expectations that the upgrading of these actors in the policy-process would lead to policy-
change have scarcely been met.  
It is here argued that the failure of institutional change to translate into policy-change can be traced 
back to the continuity in the ‘image’ underpinning EU asylum policy (i.e. in the broadly held 
perceptions of how EU asylum policy should be handled, around which support can be mobilised for 
political purposes). 
It is widely recognised that particular institutional set-ups can mould policy-making outcomes by 
privileging select actors, and thus the matching of certain problems to certain solutions. One body of 
analysis suggests that actors’ behaviour is therefore characterised by efforts to remould institutional 
arrangements, or seek out institutional configurations favourable to the realisation of their preferences 
(‘venue-shopping’).
1  According to this body of analysis, actors can facilitate and legitimise 
institutional alteration, or a full shift of policy-making venues, by successfully changing an issue’s 
policy-image. In other words, they can alter broader perceptions of how a policy area should be dealt 
with, highlighting new or neglected problems, and instrumentalising the general expectation that these 
will be treated by new actors in new venues in order to facilitate institutional change.  
Our focus is upon what happens after institutional change has been achieved. We suggest that, in order 
to ensure that they can effect policy-change subsequent to an institutional upgrade, actors must have 
                                                 
1 Much of this builds on the work of Baumgartner and Jones, for example: Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in 
American Politics, (Chicago: UoC Press, 1993). legitimated institutional alterations by changing the policy-image along two axes: Firstly, they must 
have altered it in such a way that it legitimates their function in the policy process (hereafter the 
functional dimension). This function might be to provide policy ideas, or to legitimise outcomes. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, they need to have altered it in such a way that it legitimates 
the pursuit of their substantive preferences (the substantive dimension). We argue that institutional 
change laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam was facilitated by a policy-image that lacked the latter 
element. The newly empowered actors have subsequently struggled to assert their substantive 
preferences. 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the image/venue school of analysis, highlighting its utility 
in efforts to shed light upon recent institutional change. It also shows how a distinction between the 
functional and substantive dimensions of a policy-image can be employed to explain change and 
continuity in policy after institutional change (I). The paper then turns its focus to the institutional 
changes laid out under the Amsterdam Treaty. It argues that, although the EP and Commission 
successfully altered the policy-image to legitimate their presence in the policy-process, they failed to 
legitimate the subsequent pursuit of their substantive preferences (II). In a review of the subsequent 
negotiations on the Asylum Reception Directive
2, the paper suggests that the lack of change in the 
substantive dimension of the policy-image is an important reason for the continuity in EU asylum 
policy. MEPs’ relatively successful opposition to the proposals for the ‘joint external processing’ of 
asylum-seekers does suggest, though, that an ex-post alteration to the substantive dimension is 
possible (III). The paper ends with a consideration of the prospects for policy-change (IV).  
 
I.1 Venue-, image- and policy-change  
The image/venue school employs a line of analysis to which relatively few have had recourse in the 
specific context of EU Studies
3; however it has already been successfully applied to the early 
development of European migration policy.
4 According to this school, continuity and change in 
policies can often be traced to a change in the institutional venues in which policies are drawn up. For 
scholars like Baumgartner and Jones, competition for influence over policy is therefore characterised 
by actors’ search for policy-making venues that offer a more congenial environment for the realisation 
of their preferences.
5  
The shift to new venues can be legitimated by actors who successfully alter the ‘policy-image’ of an 
issue. Policy-images are defined by this school as public understandings of policy problems, and the 
public become convinced of a policy-image through a cocktail of empirical data and emotive appeals 
presented by actors.
6  
A common means of using policy-images to facilitate institutional and policy-change is offered by 
‘conflict expansion’.
7 This term describes how institutionally marginalised actors can expand their 
ranks, perhaps by politicising new problems and rendering them worthy of broader, public attention. 
By mobilising broader perceptions that an issue should be treated by different actors and in a different 
way, previously sidelined actors can create bottom-up pressure for institutional change.  
Efforts to shift a policy-image will often take their cue from the occurrence of problems that are not 
currently being met by policies. Although new or neglected problems should not, however, be 
understood as in some way pre-given (they depend upon how actors perceive and process them), the 
                                                 
2 Council of the EU, Directive Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Applicants for Asylum in the Member States 
(2003/9/EC) adopted 27
th January 2003. 
3 A useful overview of the relevance for the EU of this School’s analysis of agenda-setting is given by: Sebastiaan Princen, "Agenda-setting 
in the European Union: A Theoretical Exploration and Agenda for Research", NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 2005. 
4 Guiraudon (2000). 
5 Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 
6 James True, Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner, "Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in American Policy-
Making", in: Paul Sabatier (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder: Westview, 2007) 155-189. For reasons of conceptual clarity, this 
paper refers to a policy-image (singular). In actual fact, there are as many images as there are actors to perceive them. The principal referent 
actors here are the broader public and the European Council. 
7 Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Setting, (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1983). 
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search for suitable problems that might allow them to legitimise the pursuit of their preferences.
8  
The dimensions of a successful policy-image 
These ideas require some modification for our purposes.  
It should, for example, be recognised that EU policy-making is often low-key and its details are 
largely unknown to the public. The possibilities for actors to mould and re-mould ‘public 
understandings’, let alone translate these into political resources at the European level, are therefore 
limited. For that reason, we argue that a policy-image can be considered successful if it allows actors 
to mobilise the critical mass of political support necessary to effect policy- or institutional change. Far 
from directing arguments and empirical evidence at the broader public, actors in the EU context might 
seek exclusively to convince higher placed political actors of the merits of their priorities, mobilising 
elite-based support. We recognise, though, that a policy-image mobilising narrow, elite perceptions 
can be of a different quality and utility to one garnering broad, bottom-up support. 
Further, whilst the image/venue school has focussed primarily on the question how actors can 
facilitate institutional change, we are principally interested in what happens afterwards. We argue that 
a successful policy-image, which not only facilitates institutional change but also ensures that newly 
empowered actors can subsequently assert their preferences, will consist of two dimensions:  
•  first, a dimension that legitimates actors’ presence and function in the policy process. In the 
case of EU asylum policy-making, this function might be to provide legitimacy, expertise 
and/or new ideas to policy-making.  
•  second, a dimension that legitimates the pursuit of their substantive preferences. In the case of 
EU asylum policy, these substantive preferences might be of a political (electoral), 
‘administrative’ (related to social, economic, foreign or internal security policy concerns) or 
legal-normative (relating to the rights afforded to non-nationals) nature. 
Difficulties arise because institutional change can be facilitated by the functional dimension alone; in 
such cases, actors may subsequently struggle to pursue their substantive preferences even after their 
position in policy-making has been bolstered.  
The distinction between the two dimensions of the policy-image can be illustrated by reference to the 
case of the European Commission: it will be suggested below that at the 1996 IGC, the Commission 
justified an upgrade in its role in asylum policy-making by convincing other political actors of the 
failures inherent in Third-Pillar policy-making, and of the useful function it might play in overcoming 
the slow progress of negotiations (for example by ‘neutralising’ agenda-setting or providing new ideas 
for the realisation of policy aims). Although such a change to the functional dimension of the policy-
image helped win it an institutional upgrade, the Commission subsequently struggled to pursue its own 
preferences and priorities in policy-making: it had merely showed that it could play a useful role in 
facilitating the conclusion of the kind of substantive policies already being drawn up. Other political 
actors resisted its efforts to assert its own substantive priorities where these differed from those of the 
Council. 
By contrast, a successful policy-image allowing actors not only to facilitate institutional change, but 
also to effect subsequent policy-change, will contain both a functional and a substantive dimension. In 
order to create such an image, actors will point to problems in the current substantive treatment of 
asylum, and show that only they have the capacity to deal with them. The Commission might point to 
the idea that EU asylum policy in its current form is neglecting important social, economic and foreign 
policy problems, and that only it has the expertise to deal with these. The EP might, meanwhile, 
mobilise support by pointing to the problems arising from the restriction of asylum-seekers’ rights in 
favour of the Executives’ scope for manoeuvre, and play on expectations that only it – thanks to its 
‘normal’ control-function over the Executive – can solve such problems.  
We do not argue that the lack of a fitting substantive dimension will entirely prevent an actor from 
pursuing its preferences; however, should it attempt to assert itself without a fitting substantive image, 
                                                 
8 These assumptions therefore share much with conceptions of ‘organisational anarchy’: John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1984).  
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mobilise broader political resources in its support. Nor do we contend that it is impossible for actors to 
make up a policy-image deficit once institutional change has occurred; however, an initial deficit can 
have a short-, and perhaps even long-, term effect on newly empowered actors’ capacity to pursue 
their preferences: Not only will newly empowered actors have to persuade a broad range of actors of 
the merits of their substantive preferences, they may also have to discredit those of their rivals. In 
response to newly empowered actors’ efforts to shift the policy-image, policy-makers benefiting from 
the current substantive policy-image may seek to alter the presentation of the way in which an issue is 
handled, redrawing the lines between their opponents and supporters.
9  In this way, a ‘policy 
monopoly’ may maintain its hold over substantive policy outcomes even as its formal power has 
diminished. 
Whilst a change in institutional fora is a key factor to matters of access and influence in the policy-
process, we recognise that there are many other forms of change in the inter-actor balance that can 
precede policy-change (the development, maturation and sophistication of non-governmental 
organizations, the emergence of new problems). We cannot, therefore, hope to explain all the factors 
behind the lack of policy-change after Amsterdam. 
Despite these limitations, we seek to show that the concept of a policy-image, and its disaggregation 
into these two relatively distinct dimensions, can be used to illuminate not only the extension of 
formal powers to actors, but also –and more importantly for our purposes- these actors’ subsequent 
capacity to influence policy. The construction of a powerful, substantive policy-image might afford 
actors influence beyond that which they enjoy de jure; the absence of one might have the opposite 
effect. We seek to show that the substantive dimension was missing for those actors which underwent 
an institutional upgrade at Amsterdam; hence, the Commission and EP have been unable to effect 
policy-change. They failed either to persuade other, higher placed actors of their substantive priorities 
or to mobilise broader public support in favour of their preferences. 
I.2 Explaining the pre-Amsterdam security-orientation of EU asylum policies  
On the basis of an analysis of a core group of member states (Germany, France and the Netherlands), 
it has been shown how, by shifting policy-making to the European level, national interior ministry 
officials overcame the institutional barriers that blocked the realisation of their security- and control-
oriented policy aims at the national level.
10 Cooperating in venues set up for European cooperation on 
core matters of internal security, and largely spared the bothersome interference of their political 
masters as well as of other ministries, parliament, legal professionals and of NGOs, interior ministry 
officials thereby sidelined impediments to their control- and security-oriented agenda. The 
participating officials can thus be shown to have successfully ‘venue-shopped’.
11
Disaggregating the policy-image 
It is possible to disaggregate the policy-image that legitimised this venue-change into two semi-
distinct dimensions - one related to the substance of policy, the other related to the institutional 
framework in which it was to be handled. To deal with the substantive dimension first: interior 
ministry officials are shown to have sought out problems in order to promote solutions which were 
sometimes predefined.
12 In order to legitimise security- and control-oriented asylum cooperation, 
these actors emphasised the threat posed by uncontrolled migration in the context of member states’ 
efforts to remove intra-EC/EU borders. These were then linked to a ‘continuum’ of hard (terrorism), 
soft (transnational criminality)
13  and even broader security threats (threat to welfare systems; 
employment prospects of citizens; national social and cultural cohesion
14). Despite the presentation of 
                                                 
9 This dynamic is also described by True, Jones and Baumgartner (2007).  
10 Virginie Guiraudon, (2000); "Seeking New Venues: The Europeanization of Migration-Related Policies", Swiss Political Science Review, 
7,3 (2001), 99-120. 
11 See also: Eiko Thielemann, "The Soft Europeanisation of Migration Policy." Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 
22-27 March 2002. 
12 Virginie Guiraudon, "The EU 'Garbage Can': Differential Development, Adhocratism, Opportunism in the Immigration Domain" European 
Community Studies Association, Madison, WI, 31May -2 June, 2001. 
13 For an analysis of the idea of a security continuum: Didier Bigo, "The European Internal Security Field Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly 
Developing Area of Police Intervention", in: Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer (eds), Policing Across National Boundaries, (London: 
Pinter, 1994), p. 164. 
14 Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", Journal of Common Market Studies, 38,5 (2000) 751–77. 
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claimed, these actors succeeded in generalising a security threat from limited evidence.
15  
Meanwhile, a second, functional, dimension of the policy-image legitimated officials’ presence in (or 
rather their almost total monopoly of) the policy process. That officials were able to show that they 
alone had the necessary expertise to deal with these problems, was just one aspect of this: another 
aspect justified the exclusion of other actors from policy-making. Although the policy-image that 
underpinned the institutional set-up had a strong European flavour – based, as it was, upon arguments 
concerning the risks arising from the removal of Europe’s internal borders - it was nevertheless an 
image that justified cooperation outside the integrated European Community (EC) framework, and 
thus the exclusion of a broad number of actors usually present at the European level: officials 
highlighted the need for effectiveness in migration-control policy-making; this may be understood as 
an ‘executive priority’, and has subsequently justified the removal or circumvention of the legal, 
normative-democratic and politico-administrative constraints that reduced executive scope for 
manoeuvre at the national level.
16 The policy-making venue carved out at the European level was thus 
one which limited judicial and parliamentary oversight of the Executive associated with the traditional 
‘Community method’; it also justified the circumvention of some of the constraints on effectiveness 
internal to the Executive itself: ‘horizontal’ consensus-building between different domestic ministries 
and even ‘vertical’ coordination between the  political and administrative level of the national 
Executive was subsequently minimal in early European asylum cooperation. 
The arguments underpinning this image as a whole were seldom communicated by the participating 
officials directly to the public: measures responded, and were justified by reference, to a highly 
politicised conception of asylum, citing the dangers it posed to internal security, society and the 
economy. This proved convincing to the political level of national governments, which were faced 
with electoral pressures over asylum issues. Furthermore, “[n]ational leaders supported international 
co-operation on migration control because it demonstrated activism yet diffused the responsibility for 
and efficacy of control”.
17 National interior ministry officials thus operated with the backing of 
powerful political patrons, insofar as these were aware of their activities.
18 The participating officials 
appear to have achieved a policy-image accepted by both governmental elites and the broader public. 
 
II. Explaining the institutional changes at Amsterdam 
Prior to the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, there were numerous actors jostling to change 
the way that policies were drawn up at the European level. They sought to challenge the dominance of 
the interior officials and ministers of a core group of member states (actors from France, Germany and 
even the Netherlands and the UK may be seen to have operated to a large degree as a ‘policy 
monopoly’).  
The roots of ‘rival’ actors’ dissatisfaction are not difficult to isolate: The proper regulation of national 
economies and welfare systems had been disrupted by control-centric, securitarian policies, giving 
domestic and Commission actors dealing with social and economic affairs an incentive for action
19: 
EU asylum and immigration policy-makers failed to acknowledge the benefits that immigration 
affords social and economic systems, dealing principally with the social and economic problems 
caused by immigration and addressing them via simplistic, control-oriented policies. They also 
appropriated social and economic policy tools for the purposes of border control efforts, restricting 
access to labour markets and social systems in an effort to deflect prospective immigrants. Similarly, 
domestic and Commission officials dealing with the EU’s external relations found that the control 
                                                 
15 Didier Bigo, (2002) "Security and Immigration, toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease" in Alternatives, vol. 27, pp. 63-92. 
See also Geddes, A (2000) Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?  MUP: Manchester pp.22-26.  
16 For a recent overview in the context of the German EU-Presidency: Daniela Kietz and Roderick Parkes "Die deutsche EU-
Ratspräsidentschaft: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer ausgewogenen Inneren Sicherheits- und Migrationspolitik", Internationale Politik und 
Gesellschaft (2007). 
17 Guiraudon (2000).  
18 For an analysis of the relations between the political and administrative levels in this early cooperation: Adrian Favell, "The 
Europeanisation of Immigration Politics", in: European Integration online Papers 2,10 (1998). 
19 For an analysis of welfare changes and immigration see: Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes (ed.s) Immigration and Welfare: 
Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State, (London: Routledge, 2000). For analysis of Commission officials’ efforts to break open 
policy-making: Favell (1998).  
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20 of migration policy undermined their policy aims (for 
example of development policy
21 and diplomatic efforts
22), souring relations with third states expected 
to function as extended border controls for the EU.
23 Such developments were of concern to MEPs 
and NGOs, who were also motivated to break open the secretive, security-centric policy-making, 
which had seen the formulation of policies that reduced the legal and normative-democratic constraints 
on Executive power in society.
24 Finally, the requirements imposed on the EU’s peripheral southern 
and eastern members within the framework of successive enlargement processes have seen new 
member states implement migration-control policies that reflect their interests less than those of the 
“old” members.
25   
The policy-making framework drawn up in the Amsterdam reform of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) did indeed empower previously 
marginalised actors to exert influence in, and potentially to reform, asylum policy. Article 67 TEC 
gives the Commission a shared right of initiative alongside the member states, shifting to a sole right 
after five years. Through its proposals, the Commission enjoys a not insignificant capacity to frame 
debates and negotiations, as well as to steer its priorities through the policy process.  
The Amsterdam Treaty also upgraded parliamentary input into policy by introducing the EP as a 
consultative body within the new Title IV of the TEC (Articles 61-69) covering the “Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice”. Whilst until May 2004 the EP was only to be consulted, Article 67 TEC allowed 
the Council to introduce the co-decision procedure after the end of this transitional period. One should 
not exaggerate the formal influence that consultation powers afford the EP in the policy-process; 
however, should the EP be in possession of strong substantive arguments, and even be able to mobilise 
broader support behind them, it might be able to directly frame the form and substance of the EU’s 
policies with regard to: asylum, refugees and temporary protection; regular immigration including 
relevant measures on integration of third country nationals; rights of regular third country nationals 
including the right to reside in another Member State; and irregular immigration including return 
measures.  
We suggested above that actors might facilitate this kind of institutional upgrade merely by pointing to 
the useful function that they could play in policy-making (by legitimising or facilitating the conclusion 
of current substantive preferences). Yet, if they wished to be able to assert their own preferences 
immediately after an institutional upgrade, they would have to have created a policy-image with a 
strong substantive dimension. It is, therefore, worth identifying whether the institutional changes laid 
down at Amsterdam were the result of a change of policy-image, and – if so - whether this image had a 
strong substantive, or merely a functional, dimension. 
II.1 Image change at Amsterdam and the missing substantive dimension. 
Although they do not explicitly recognise it as such, some analyses of the Amsterdam Treaty do trace 
the institutional change laid down in that document to an image-shift: the European Parliament created 
arguments that justified its involvement in asylum policy-making by highlighting the sensitivity of 
justice and home affairs policies for national citizens as well as the marginalisation of national 
                                                 
20 “The 'external dimension' of EU asylum and immigration policies was officially embraced only in 1999 at the Special European Council 
on Justice and Home Affairs in Tampere. […] Yet European cooperation in these matters has always had an external dimension.” Sandra 
Lavenex, "Shifting Up and Out: the Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control", West European Politics, 29, 2, (2006) 329-350, p.333. 
21 Christina Boswell,  "The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Cooperation in Immigration and Asylum", International Affairs 73,3 (2003), 619-38; 
For an analysis of more recent developments: Ben Hayes and Tony Bunyan, "Migration, development and the EU security agenda", in: 
Europe in the World: Essays on EU Foreign, Security and Development Policies. (London: BOND, 2003) 71-80. 
22 Sandra Lavenex, (2006). 
23 Roderick Parkes, "Joint Patrols at the EU’s Southern Border", SWP Comment, (SWP: Berlin, 2006a). 
24 For an analysis of the way that these legal constraints have been overcome: Thielemann (2002).  
25 For an analysis of the migration requirements imposed on accession states in the 2004 and previous EU enlargements see: Catherine 
Phuong "Enlarging ‘Fortress Europe’: EU Accession, Asylum, and Immigration in Candidate Countries", International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 52,3, (2003) 641-664; More specifically on the new member states: Sandra Lavenex, "EU Enlargement and the Challenge of 
Policy Transfer: the Case of Refugee Policy" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, 4 (2002)  701-721. Although the southern member 
states have signed up to security-oriented policies, and appear to accept their merits, they still have reservations. These reservations have 
more to do with their lack of the necessary infrastructure to carry them out, than their concerns specific social, economic or foreign policy 
problems. Nevertheless, these states might expect to find an ally in the European Commission, which, as a supranational actor, could 
promote the European interest and solidarity between the member states. 
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26 These concerns fed into ideas and discourses accepted by the 
Treaty negotiators about the legitimisation of policy, and about the role of parliaments in policy-
making
27 (the twin aims of increasing accountability and transparency had also strongly informed the 
IGC agenda). This shift in the policy-image can thus be seen to have created a degree of elite-based 
pressure for institutional change, and somewhat altered a policy-image that had stressed the 
importance of effectiveness in policy-making (and thus of overcoming normative-democratic 
constraints on Executive action).  
Meanwhile the Commission was apparently able to convince the member state governments that the 
communitarisation of policy-making –and more specifically, the upgrading of its role - would help 
neutralise agenda-setting and reduce defection from common policies on the part of the member states. 
This latter aspect was particularly important in the political environment prior to the 2004 
enlargement, since a number of states with a poor infrastructure and immigration policy requirements 
considerably diverging from the EU-15 ‘norm’ were being groomed for accession. The Commission 
might also perform a role generating policy-proposals that member state Executives would be free to 
pick and choose from.
28  
Treaty change can, therefore, be partly explained by the way that the Commission and EP convinced 
the Treaty negotiators, and perhaps even a broader range of actors, that they would be able to perform 
a useful function in policy-making (increasing the legitimacy of policy or overcoming a number of 
problems that arose under the Third Pillar policy-making arrangements). Yet, the EP and Commission 
did not appear to have altered the substantive dimension of the policy-image, nor created a policy-
image successfully marrying the two dimensions. The EP and Commission did not apparently succeed 
in showing that problems were being neglected or, indeed created, by the current substantive form of 
asylum policy, let alone shown had the necessary skills and resources to meet these problems. 
Although the EP had traditionally stressed the importance of respecting migrants’ rights and liberties, 
and the Commission, had pushed for substantive change on grounds of social, economic and foreign 
policy
29, these arguments, and the idea that only they could overcome them, did not apparently foster a 
critical mass of either elite-based or bottom-up pressure for institutional change in the service of 
substantive change.    
II.2 Explaining the failure of substantive policy-image change 
Since it is of relevance to actors’ subsequent attempts to make up the substantive deficit in a policy-
image, it is worth asking what explains actors’ failure prior to Amsterdam to change the substantive 
dimension of the policy-image? The fact should not be ignored that even some actors that appear 
broadly opposed to the securitarian agenda have certain incentives to promote the predominant 
security-centric vision of asylum:  
-  Since the Commission’s position in policy-making is partly dependent on the degree of 
European integration achieved, it has previously supported restrictive, control-oriented 
measures where these have promoted European integration per se.
30 On a more abstract level, 
the identification of a security threat can be understood as part of the EU’s process of self-
constitution and -definition: by identifying the threat to an entity, the entity to be protected is 
also constituted. 
                                                 
26 See for example: Jörg Monar, (1995) "Democratic Control of Justice and Home Affair: The European Parliament and National 
Parliaments" in Roland Bieber and Jörg Monar (ed.s), Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union: The Development of the Third Pillar 
(Brussels: Interuniversity Press, 1995). 
27 For an analysis of these norms see: Berthold Rittberger Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic Representation beyond the Nation-State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
28 Brendan Smith and William Wallace, "Constitutional Deficits of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Transparency, Accountability and Judicial 
Control", in: Jörg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, (London/New York: Continuum 
2001), 125-149; Mark Gray, "The European Commission: Seeking the Highest Possible Realistic Line", in: Finn Laursen (ed.), The 
Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2002), 381-404; 
Andreas Maurer, "The European Parliament: Win-Sets of a Less Invited Guest", in: Laursen (2002) 405-452; Monica Den Boer "A New 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Shaping of a Hybrid Compromise" in: Laursen (2002), 509-535. Guiraudon, meanwhile, traces 
the changes to domestic interministerial competition, and the efforts of Treaty negotiators in national Foreign Ministries to get one over on 
their colleagues in interior ministries: Guiraudon (2000) p. 265. 
29 Favell (1998); Lavenex (2006). 
30  Andrew Geddes Immigration and European Integration. Towards Fortress Europe? (Manchester: MUP, 2000). 
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electorate as a threat to citizens. Although the relative distance between the European 
Parliament and the electorate in many ways reduces the potential gains for MEPs from this 
kind of behaviour, the search to bolster its own legitimacy may encourage the European 
Parliament as a whole to pursue policies more obviously responding to citizens’ narrow 
interests. In this way, MEPs’ efforts to shift the functional dimension of the policy-image by 
highlighting justice and home affairs’ sensitivity to the electorate may have come at the 
expense of their scope to alter the substantive dimension of an image which is based on 
arguments that refer so acutely to the political (electoral) problems of asylum. 
Moreover, interior ministry actors were well able to defend their substantive preferences. This was 
in no small part down to the fact that their dominant institutional position in pre-Amsterdam 
asylum cooperation had redistributed political resources in their favour; these could then be 
instrumentalised to lend weight to their vision of asylum. Scholars have previously touched on this 
phenomenon, noting that “the link between security, migration and European integration made for 
strange bedfellows: liberal pro-EU politicians could not disapprove of European migration-control 
harmonisation coming from anti-EU, restrictionist politicians”
31  Thus, since European 
cooperation, even outside the EC/EU framework, is underpinned by strong ideological 
justifications, agreements concluded could be legitimated, not solely by reference to their 
substantive merits, but also to their desirability for maintaining cooperation. Yet, this observation 
captures just one of the ways in which European cooperation redistributed political resources in 
favour of those most closely involved
32: 
-  idea exchange between participants from different member states was facilitated through their 
cooperation within the Trevi and EU frameworks. On the basis of these exchanges, 
participants could diffuse responsibility for policy ideas, and disguise their own vested 
interests when presenting them at the national level. They could also lend normative 
acceptance to a proposed measure by pointing to its application and acceptability in another 
state. 
-  information exchange between officials on asylum matters also occurred within these 
frameworks. Informational asymmetries between the officials most closely engaged in 
cooperation and other actors thus increased. These officials could make selective use of the 
information they gathered — it could be released or withheld, depending on whether it would 
mobilise opposition or support.  
Whilst political resources accrued to those actors most directly involved in EU policy-making, they 
seeped away from those seeking to insert themselves into the European policy process. It was, for 
example, difficult for marginalised actors to engage in conflict expansion over an alternative 
substantive dimension of EU asylum: whilst actors could excite public attention for the functional 
dimension of the policy-image (by playing on general pro-, or anti-, European sentiment and fostering 
support or opposition for the treatment of specific policy-areas by actors at the EC/EU-level), trying to 
raise public attention for the substantive form of the policies drawn up at the European level was much 
harder given the low-key nature of much of the policy-making.
33 Even assuming that conflict 
expansion were easily practicable in the EU-context, it would hardly be helpful for those seeking to 
shift the current substantive asylum policy-image; indeed, the somewhat populist conception of 
asylum-seekers as a threat to the state and national citizenry infers that conflict expansion and the 
politicisation of asylum issues will actually be detrimental to those promoting a non-security-oriented 
policy.  
Furthermore, irrespective of the institutional position of its proponents, the substantive dimension of 
the securitarian asylum policy-image was robust: The problems arising from policy failure (problems 
                                                 
31 Guiraudon (2000) p.261. 
32 For a conceptualisation of this redistribution of domestic  political resources through European integration: Andrew Moravcsik, Why the 
EC Strengthens the State, Centre for European Studies Working Paper 52, Harvard Department of Government, Cambridge MA 1994). For a 
conceptualisation specific to Justice and Home Affairs: Eiko Thielemann, The Soft Europeanisation of Migration Policy, ECPR Joint 
Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 22-27.3.2002; Roderick Parkes and Andreas Maurer, Britische Anti-Terror-Politik und die 
Internationalisierung der Inneren Sicherheit. Zur Balance zwischen Freiheit, Sicherheit und Demokratie, SWP Study, (Berlin: SWP, 2007). 
33For an analysis of ‘contentious protest’ in the EU: Imig and Tarrow (eds) (2001).  
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the case of a security-centric asylum policy, have actually strengthened its substantive image: critics 
identify the ‘virtualism’ of efforts to combat unwanted immigration; they suggest that measures taken 
against illegal immigration often criminalise further categories of immigrant, thus creating higher 
levels of illegal immigration and with them an apparent reason for more of the same policies.
34 A 
similar effect can be identified in the efforts to reduce the numbers of asylum-seekers recognised as in 
need of protection: In reality, dips in recognition rates for refugees are not simply a reflection of a 
growth in the numbers of unfounded asylum applications- in many cases they also indicate a more 
restrictive interpretation of asylum laws; yet they may easily be presented as such.
35 Asylum policies 
restricting asylum-seekers’ social and employment rights have, meanwhile, added to precisely those 
phenomena they professed to prevent- a dip in ‘social cohesion’, a rise in welfare dependence and 
increased recourse to unregulated employment.
36 Thus, the negative effects of the sub-optimal 
management of a policy-area actually serve as justification for its continued regulation in the same 
way. The ‘problems’ evidencing the fact that a reactive, control-centric policy cannot fully steer 
migration (for example the continued presence of large numbers of ‘bogus’ or failed asylum-seekers 
on the national territory) are used to legitimate rather than negate its continuance.  
II.3 Missed opportunities to shift the substantive image: The external dimension of asylum 
policy  
It should not be inferred that actors pursuing alternative preferences enjoyed no political opportunities 
for asserting themselves and their priorities in policy-making: even in the pre-Amsterdam phase of 
asylum cooperation, one aspect of asylum in particular had begun to create new problems for policy-
makers and thus new political opportunities for both dominant and marginal actors- the ‘external 
dimension’ of asylum policy.  
Interior ministry actors are not the only ones to turn their attention to the external dimension of 
asylum. Not only do those actors dealing with external security have an interest in these problems, so 
too do diplomatic, development and trade policy actors. Inter-institutional tension has, however, arisen 
because previously unimportant differences in the underlying principles held by internal and external 
policy actors have gained salience. At the risk of over-generalising, it is possible to differentiate these 
principles in two broad ways
37:  
Firstly, actors in domestic external policy ministries and the relevant Commission units frequently 
justify their activity partly with reference to the interests of third states, or to the interests of the 
citizens of third countries (the latter through arguments concerning humanitarianism or ‘human 
security’). They do so to a degree in order to extend the range of their activities away from those 
external affairs that directly affect the narrow interests of their state and citizens. By contrast, interior 
policy actors are primarily interested in external events when they have a direct effect on the state. It 
is the security of the state and citizens that counts, and it is with reference to this that policy is 
legitimised.  
Secondly, external policy actors have increasingly taken a pre-emptive and curative approach to those 
external phenomena such as poverty or human rights abuse which may cause migration flows to the 
EU. Again arguments about the desirability of pre-emptively dealing with phenomena that may one 
day be of significance to the state can be used to extend the scope of external actors’ activity beyond 
those elements of immediate relevance to state-interest. By contrast, interior policy actors have only 
had to deal with these issues when their side-effects reach the state. Subsequently, the latter’s policy 
tools and ways of dealing with problems are highly reactive to external events (border controls, for 
example, deal with migration flows once they have begun). The opening up of new opportunities for 
                                                 
34 Michael Samers, "An Emerging Geopolitics of Illegal Immigration in the European Union" European Journal of Migration and Law, 6 
(2004), 23-41. 
35 For a pertinent analysis of the way that efforts to restrict immigration can affect asylum policy: Aninia Nadig, "Human Smuggling, 
National Security, and Refugee Protection" Journal of Refugee Studies, 15,1, (2002) 1-25. 
36 See for example: Pamela Jackson and Roderick Parkes, "Immigration Policy and the Social Exclusion of Minorities: British Securitization 
1948-2003" Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries, 1,2 (2006), .5-31 
37 For a more in-depth analysis on the specific topic of external and internal security see: Ferruccio Pastore, Reconciling the Prince's Two 
‘Arms’: Internal-External Security Policy Coordination in the European Union EU-ISS Occasional Paper 30, October 2001. For an analysis 
of the priorities of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ actors in migration policy: Joanne van Selm "Immigration and Asylum or Foreign Policy: The 
EU's Approach to Migrants and their countries of origin", in: Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer (eds.), Externalities of EU Immigration and 
Asylum Policies (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002). 
  9external action has been treated by these actors as a means to redeploy their reactive policy tools 
abroad- a process which can, though, only occur via the use of external policy actors’ tools.  
Even prior to Amsterdam, the ‘external dimension’ of asylum became a contested area, with 
competing actors seeking to control the way that it is dealt with. All the same, none of the external 
actors apparently succeeded in instrumentalising these differences of approach in order to justify a 
policy-change
38; the external dimension of asylum policy continued to be characterised by the 
reactive-restrictive measures preferred by interior policy actors that used third countries as buffer 
zones against unwanted immigration to the EU.
39
Certainly, the external dimension of asylum policy seems fertile terrain spawning ready arguments 
which interior ministry actors can cite in order to extend the application of their security-centric 
agenda: an approach reactive to those external events of most immediate relevance to state interests 
intuitively accords with electoral imperatives in a politically sensitive policy-area; more altruistic 
proposals based on humanitarian imperatives would probably not tread water with actors faced with 
the political consequences of electoral dissatisfaction. Yet, the promise of the ‘external dimension’ of 
asylum as a political opportunity for actors currently marginal to asylum policy-making lies in the fact 
that there are entrenched ideas and approaches underpinning states’ and the Union’s external action. 
Ideas about the merits of curative external policies undertaken in the mutual interests of member states 
and third countries/ their citizens appear increasingly established. Furthermore, external policy actors 
can lend normative weight to the arguments about their substantive priorities by recruiting vocal 
political allies outside the EU (third countries and their citizens). Finally, the positive or negative 
effects on the electorate deriving from external policies regulating asylum are somewhat more diffuse 
and more difficult for citizens to trace than internal policies; there may indeed be more room for the 
interests of third countries and their nationals in policy-making. 
 
III. After the institutional change at Amsterdam: policy-change without substantive image-
change? 
Although some actors, notably the EP and Commission, may, then, be seen to have shifted the policy-
image of asylum at Amsterdam to legitimate their presence in policy-making, none appeared to have 
successfully shifted this image to allow for the pursuit of their substantive preferences. In the absence 
of change to the substantive policy-image, would the actors be able to exploit their institutional 
upgrade and assert their preferences? To address this question, we here analyse the progress of a major 
piece of EU asylum legislation (the Reception Directive) as well as of a high-profile proposal (that of 
the ‘joint external processing’ of asylum applicants). Whilst the EP and Commission remain our prime 
focus, we examine not only those actors who enjoyed a formal institutional upgrade at Amsterdam, but 
also the other actors described above as dissatisfied with the pre-Amsterdam substance of EU asylum 
policy (particularly NGOs and the southern member states). 
The Reception Directive provides an example of a measure unlikely to excite much public attention. 
The Directive deals with social, economic and security problems that have previously offered few 
political opportunities for other actors to contest the dominant security-centric image. Against this 
background, we would expect the newly upgraded actors to struggle to alter the substantive policy-
image ex-post, undermining their capacity to pursue their preferences.  
By contrast, the external dimension provides opportunities for actors to create an alternative to the 
existing substantive dimension of the asylum policy-image. Against this background, we expect an 
analysis of the opposition to the proposal on external processing on the part of MEPs, NGOs and – 
although on a rather more low-key level – the Commission to show that these actors are capable of 
making up the ‘image-deficit’ as well as the way that a powerful substantive image can allow actors to 
exert influence ‘beyond’ their formal powers.  
                                                 
38 For a discourse analysis of the development of the external dimension, and in particular the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’, see: 
Steven Sterkx, The Comprehensive Approach off Balance: Externalisation of EU Asylum and Migration Policy, PSW Paper 2004/4, 
(Antwerp: UA, 2004). 
39 See for example: Sandra Lavenex, "‘Passing the Buck’: European Union Refugee Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe", Journal of 
Refugee Studies 11,2 (1998) 126-145; Johannes van der Klaauw, "European Asylum Policy and the Global Protection Regime: Challenges 
for UNHCR", in Sandra Lavenex and Emek Ucarer (eds.), (2002) 33–53. 
  10III.1 Case study 1: the Reception Directive 
40
The Amsterdam Treaty called for the adoption of common minimum conditions for the reception of 
asylum seekers. A proposal for a relevant directive was duly presented by the Commission in April 
2001. It progressed through the unusual four-tiered Council structure set up in 1999 for dealing with 
first-pillar JHA policies (proposals are usually dealt with initially by the Asylum Working Party, 
before being passed up to the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), 
then COREPER and finally for treatment by Ministers in the JHA Council). After the EP had given its 
opinion in April 2002, the measure was adopted in January 2003.  
How would a securitarian reception directive look? 
It may seem curious to analyse this piece of legislation in order to measure continuity in EU asylum 
policy, when it had no precedent at the European level
41; nevertheless it is possible to identify the 
principles underpinning previous ‘securitarian’ policies, and to gauge their salience in the Reception 
Directive. 
As alluded to above, European asylum cooperation has seen security- and control-oriented solutions 
matched to complex social and economic problems, and social and economic policy tools used in the 
service of interior ministry actors’ goals. A securitarian reception directive would be no different.
42 
The prevalence of securitarian priorities during the negotiations can thus be fathomed in an analysis of 
those articles regulating asylum applicants’ access to society (free movement provisions; education), 
the social system (welfare benefits; healthcare) and to the economy (access to the labour market).  
The restriction and increased control of migration would be offered as a solution to the complex social 
and economic problems inherent to the reception of asylum-seekers. Problems related to the social 
system, economy and society would be met simply by blocking applicants’ access to welfare and the 
labour market, and restricting their social contact during the handling of their claims. Given the default 
assumption that applicants are ‘bogus’, the question of the long-term integration of successful asylum-
seekers into these structures would not arise.  
Social- and economic-policy tools would, meanwhile, be deployed for the purposes of increasing 
control over access to and exit from the EU. Asylum-applicants’ access to social and economic 
systems would, for example, be restricted as part of an effort increase control over migration flows by 
removing the ‘pull factors’ of ‘unwanted’ migration to the EU; such restrictions would also be seen to 
facilitate the eventual removal of failed applicants.  
Access to society (free movement and education) 
According to unofficial sources, German negotiators were particularly active in seeking to reduce 
applicants’ freedom of movement, pushing for a restriction of the relevant provisions in the 
Commission proposal (particularly Article 7). They argued for the power to restrict applicants’ 
freedom of movement during the treatment of their claim, and without offering applicants a right of 
appeal. On the other side, Sweden apparently led those in the Council who called for a liberalisation of 
the free movement provisions in the Commission proposal. Despite the concerns of the Parliament and 
NGOs, the opposition of the Commission and a small group of member states, the Commission 
proposal was, however, further restricted: Article 7(5) of the proposal, laying down that applicants had 
the right to “bring proceedings before a court against the limitations on freedom of movement”, was 
missing from the adopted text.  
Meanwhile, over the course of negotiations, the Commission’s proposed rules governing the provision 
of education for minor asylum-seekers and the children of applicants were restricted. An important 
                                                 
40 This analysis is based on interviews and questionnaires carried out during 2002-2003 with policy-makers in the EP, Commission and 
Council, as well as other actors (particularly NGOs, UNHCR) involved in the policy-process. It also draws on the official documents found 
in the relevant Statewatch file http://www.statewatch.org/semdocfree/legobs1B2.html and the EP’s proposed amendments: European 
Parliament Position on the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Laying down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum 
Applicants,, P5_TA(2002)0202.    
41 Nicola Rogers "Minimum Standards for Reception", in: European Journal of Migration and Law, 4, (2002) 215-230,, p.216. 
42 For a useful analysis see: Roland Bank "Europeanising the Reception of Asylum-Seekers: the Opposite of Welfare State Politics" in 
Bommes and Geddes (ed.s) (2000) 148-169; "Reception Conditions for Asylum Seekers in Europe: An Analysis of Provisions in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom", Nordic Journal of International Law 69,3 (2000) 257-288.  See also Geoff Gilbert, "Is 
Europe Living Up to Its Obligations to Refugees?" The European Journal of International Law 15 ,.5(2004) .963-987. 
  11provision with implications for asylum applicants’ capacity to socially integrate was removed 
altogether: There is thus no rule on providing minors with language education (Art. 12(3) of the 
proposal). This was despite a proposed amendment from the EP which would actually have 
strengthened states’ obligations in this area.  
Access to the labour market 
The Commission, in line with UNHCR advice, proposed that states not be allowed to refuse applicants 
access to the labour market for more than six months, but left some leeway to the states to decide upon 
the specific conditions under which they would allow access. Again according to unofficial sources, a 
group of states led by France wished to further restrict access to a bare minimum in order to reduce a 
‘pull factor’ and cut down the incidence of ‘voluntary immigrants’ posing as asylum-seekers to gain 
labour market access. Those states which rely upon asylum-seekers’ working in order to minimise the 
cost of their care (foremost Greece, Sweden, Portugal) pushed for more liberal provisions. The 
Parliament, meanwhile, sought for access to be allowed after four months. Those pushing for a more 
liberal regulation were unsuccessful, as indicated by the provisions (Article 11) adopted in the final 
text. Where these were well-defined, they were restrictive, and - where lax - allowed the member 
states significant leeway to introduce their own standards. This can be partly put down to German 
influence: citing insuperable pressure from the Länder, the German government had reopened 
negotiations on the Directive even after initial political agreement between the member states had been 
reached. Germany succeeded in having the relevant Article changed to allow more scope for the 
member states to maintain their own rules about labour market access. 
A number of southern (and Scandinavian) member states prefer to offer asylum-seekers generous 
access to the labour market in order to relieve the load on the welfare system and allow applicants to 
care for themselves. These concerns were in evidence until the UK pushed the 2001 Belgian 
Presidency to propose a provision in which member states could test the level of financial means at 
applicants’ disposal, and thus whether they were able to contribute to their own reception. This 
formalised the practice whereby applicants look after themselves, but shifted from a liberal to a state-
controlled process, and was seen as a good compromise by the officials of all the member states. As a 
late addition to the text, it escaped the consideration of the Parliament, which was drawing up its 
position on the basis of the original proposal. A slightly modified version appeared in the adopted text 
(13(4)). 
Access to the social system 
Access to the labour market was a more contentious issue in the Council negotiations than access to 
the social system, since it was perceived to straddle more centrally the legal and conceptual 
distinctions between voluntary (economic) immigration and forced migration. Offering generous 
access to the labour market was thus deemed to constitute more of a pull factor for abuse of the 
asylum process by economic immigrants than access to the social system.  
Reflecting its more limited salience, access to the social system was not restricted to the same degree 
as equivalent provisions on the labour market. One or two of the standards for access to the social 
system were actually above those proposed by the Commission. Provisions in the Commission 
proposal permitting the withdrawal of benefits from those who prevent children attending school, or 
who partake in certain forms of ‘negative behaviour’ were deleted (Art. 22 of the proposal).  
Where a core group of north-western member states sought to reduce the standards in the Commission 
proposal, they were largely successful. The UK, for example, exploited the reopening of negotiations 
on the Directive by Germany to push for the inclusion of new grounds for the withdrawal of benefits. 
It successfully introduced the provision that if the asylum applicant had not lodged a claim within a 
“reasonably practicable” time after arrival, then reception conditions could be refused (Art. 16(2)). 
This provision was aimed at preventing the abuse of the asylum system by voluntary immigrants who 
make claims when their illegal status has been discovered and who thereby seek to delay their 
removal. After feverish telephone calls to his counterparts, the then UK Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett, secured the amendment. This brought it into line with provisions that the UK government 
was seeking to introduce at the national level. Beyond the arguments underpinning the securitarian 
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43 from the Directive to pressure 
the other member states to accept its proposal; it was then able to add normative acceptance to the 
domestic measure by showing that it was in line with its European obligations. 
The influence of ‘rival’ actors 
This analysis does indeed suggest that, above all, a core group of interior ministry actors from France, 
Germany and the UK succeeded in leaving their mark on the Reception Directive. Despite the 
recommendations of the Commission, Parliament and NGOs as well as some of their counterparts in 
the JHA Council, they considerably restricted asylum-seekers’ access to society, the social system and 
the labour market. None of the newly empowered actors really succeeded in asserting their preferences 
despite the new formal opportunities afforded them. How can this be explained?  
None of the ‘failed’ actors appears to have successfully engaged in conflict expansion over substantive 
concerns during the passage of the Reception Directive. EP, Commission, UNHCR and NGOs could 
not, therefore, rely upon bottom-up support for their various positions. Beyond the difficulties 
associated with garnering broader interest in the European level, these newly empowered actors were 
wary of endangering their still precarious position in policy-making. UNHCR had, for example, been 
afforded the unusual privilege of an invitation to sit in on a meeting of the Council’s Asylum Working 
Party.  
As for elite-based support, whilst the Commission and EP might have appealed to the European 
Council for support in justifying their presence in policy-making, they received little support from the 
European Council for their substantive priorities: although the European Council’s 1999 Tampere 
Conclusions contained pronouncements from which previously marginalised actors might have drawn 
political leverage
44, the European Council quickly returned to more familiar terrain, exhorting the 
Council of Ministers to tackle illegal immigration and to adopt measures quickly.
45Empirical and 
emotive arguments concerning specific substantive issues were thus largely confined to intra- and 
inter-institutional bartering.  
It is important to recognise the activism of the member states in setting the framework for the 
Commission proposal, and thus removing some of its opportunities to insert its preferences in policy-
making: the French Presidency (second semester of 2000), for example, submitted a discussion paper 
for debate amongst the Asylum Working Group and Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers 
and Asylum (SCIFA).
46 Conclusions were adopted by the JHA Council in December 2000 (though 
these remained open on the issues of free movement and access to the labour market). All the same, 
the British Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has analysed the minutes of JHA meetings, 
and concludes that, even within the restricted scope of activity allowed to it by the member states, the 
Commission failed to steer even its proposals made on the basis of these Conclusions through Council 
meetings.
47
There is, therefore, little evidence that the Commission succeeded in formulating arguments 
persuasive to the core triangle of France, Germany and the UK. The Prodi Commission advocated a 
relatively open Community immigration policy
48; yet, it struggled to justify the liberalisation of 
asylum in the same terms as it has ‘voluntary’ migration. Whereas voluntary immigration can be 
promoted by appealing to states’ economic and demographic self-interest, it might prove irresponsible 
to defend asylum in the same way: this would reinforce the conceptual link between asylum and 
voluntary immigration, and encourage the perception that access to asylum can be regulated with 
                                                 
43 The UK and Ireland enjoy a special arrangement whereby they can selectively opt-in to asylum measures. 
44 The emphasis on ‘solidarity’ offered leverage to the southern member states (and the accession states); the emphasis on the societal 
integration of legally resident third-country-nationals offered opportunities for social policy actors; ‘pro-migrant NGOs’ might refer to the 
call for civil society involvement, and the references to international norms and standards; external actors could draw on the premium set on 
partnership with countries of origin and their development needs. 
45 See for example: European Council Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 2002. 
46 Note from the French Delegation to the Asylum Working Party “Conditions for Reception of Asylum Seekers”, Brussels, 23 June 2000, 
9703/00 ASILE 28. For an analysis of developments in Council prior to the presentation of the Commission proposal: Rogers (2002).  
47 ILPA ILPA Response to the Commission's Communication: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere 
Programme and Future Orientations COM (2004)401 final, 2 June 2004,  www.ilpa.org.uk (as of January 2007) 
48 European Commission Communication on a Community Immigration Policy,  COM (2000) 757. 
  13regard to states’ material self-interest. More altruistic concerns, although reiterated by the Commission 
in official documents
49, did not apparently appeal. 
Besides, the strategies of the EP and Commission did not always seem well-suited to making the most 
of their formal powers. In their arguments, parliamentarians generally failed to play on the idea that 
the EP could only perform a legitimising function if it were allowed to substantively change the form 
of the proposals.
50 On occasions, the Parliament also paid too little attention to the practicality, and 
thus credibility, of its proposals. One telling, if banal, example concerned the question of asylum-
seekers’ access to education: In her proposed amendment, the Liberal group altered the Commission’s 
proposal that applicants be given access to education within 65 days, to 21 working days in her 
proposed amendment.
51 The EP took over this proposed amendment.
52 Since the initial 65 day period 
was already felt to be impractical if applicants arrived at the beginning of the summer vacation, the 
amendment was unrealistic. (The Council altered the time period to three months, with a possibility of 
extending it to a year (Art.10)).  
Whilst the kind of principled and emotive argumentation, employed particularly by groups and parties 
of the Centre and Left, might have proved effective had they engaged in conflict expansion, it proved 
ill-suited to dealing with the Council. Yet, in the European Parliament, the Centre/Left groups’ lack of 
concern for empirically-based argument was encouraged by its exasperation at the Parliament’s still 
limited institutional position. In the Reception Directive, Council reached initial political agreement on 
a ‘general approach’ before the EP had delivered its opinion. Council actors do not appear to have 
perceived the necessity of the Parliament being allowed to pursue its substantive preferences in order 
for it play its legitimating function in policy. 
Like the Commission, the Parliament had to justify its substantive priorities with reference to 
arguments made in Council because of its continued centrality to policy-making. Taking the Council’s 
priorities as their reference point and normative standard, some parliamentarians felt that the 
Parliament’s goals were unrealistic. As the Parliament’s rapporteur on the proposed Reception 
Directive, Jorge Hernandez-Mollar, stated in the plenary debate, “I believe that neither the Socialist 
Group nor the Liberal Group [...] are up to taking responsible, rigorous and serious positions in the 
face of the phenomenon of immigration and asylum. It will therefore be very difficult for […] 
Parliament’s views in this area to be taken into account by the Council…”
53  
 
III.2 Case Study 2: joint external processing 
In March 2003, the UK’s document, “New Vision for Refugees”, put forward the idea of the ‘external 
processing’ of those making applications for asylum on its territory. In a nutshell, the UK government 
signalled its intention to “continue to take refugees but on a managed basis, processing applications in 
[…] source regions. Central to this approach, and in the interests of equity, we would also return those 
who apply for asylum here to these source regions for protection and potentially processing. 
Movements away from source regions would take place through managed refugee resettlement 
programmes enabling more effective integration of refugees.”
54 The European component of these 
plans was unclear: the paper mooted the possibility of cooperating with EU-partners under the 
burgeoning Common European Asylum System, but it also mentioned cooperation with states like 
Australia.  
A subsequent letter from the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the then Greek Prime Minister, Costas 
Simitis, distinguished between the processing of asylum claims in ‘regions of origin’ and that in 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 One near exception may be found in Anna Terron i Cusi’s speech to the Plenary as it debated the Report on the reception proposal: 
European Parliament, Minutes of the Sitting of Thursday 25
th April 2002  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20020425+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN#creitem2 (as of January 2007). 
51 European Parliament Draft Report of Hernandez Mollar: Amendments 116-224 PE302.296/AM (2002), p.26. 
52 European Parliament Position on the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Laying down Minimum Standards for the Reception of 
Asylum Applicants, P5_TA(2002)0202.  
53 European Parliament, Minutes of the Sitting of Thursday 25
th April 2002  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20020425+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN#creitem2 (as of January 2007). 
54 UK Government, New Vision for Refugees, 7 March 2003. 
  14‘transit processing centres’ (TPC). In both cases, asylum applicants making claims within the EU 
would be sent to third countries to have their claims dealt with; TPC could, though, be situated in any 
third country. Again, the EU component was left open, although close cooperation with the European 
Commission was favoured.
55  
Insofar as these plans can be tied down (they have been described as “a moving target”
56), they may 
still be seen to have borne the hallmarks of the securitarian approach
57:  
Firstly, the proposals constitute a response to the symptoms of the failure of current policy, rather than 
an alternative to this policy. The UK’s document and letter refer, for example, to the need to respond 
to the problem that most asylum-seekers are forced to enter the EU illegally paying criminal 
organisations in the process. Of course, one might ask whether this phenomenon is not down to the 
reactive-restrictive policies brought in by the EU in the first place.
58  
Secondly, the proposals offer a simplistic control-oriented response to complex and varied societal, 
social and socio-economic problems. Questions of how to safeguard the employment prospects of 
national citizens and to deal with public hostility against asylum-seekers are met with a response that 
sees the complete exclusion of certain forms of migrant from society and the economy.
59 Problems of 
how to ensure the societal integration of successful applicants or to offset the costs of caring for 
applicants would scarcely be overcome by these developments. 
Thirdly, although ostensibly based on the premise of solidarity with third countries, the proposals 
potentially shift the burden for caring for displaced persons to other states; broader foreign policy tools 
would probably have to be subordinated to the purposes of ‘encouraging’ third states to agree to accept 
(transit) processing centres on their territory.
60 Ideas about removing applicants from the EU for the 
purposes of extraterritorial processing represent a reactive rather than a curative approach to the causes 
of migration. 
Fourthly, the proposals sought to reinterpret UK’s legal obligations, and thus the constraints upon the 
Executive, suggesting that “[i]n order to make such removals the norm, the courts would need to be 
persuaded that such removal was in compliance with the Geneva Convention and Article 3, EHCR.”
61  
Despite its strong securitarian logic and the support it received from the Netherlands and Denmark
62, 
Italy and Spain
63, the proposals met with scepticism from many of the UK’s EU-partners- foremost 
Sweden and (initially at least) Germany.  
Meanwhile, the Commission, responding to a request from the European Council, presented its own 
priorities in June 2003.
64 The Commission apparently sought to take the political momentum behind 
the idea of extraterritorial activity in a less reactive-restrictive direction, breaking with the main 
proposals of the UK. It put forward the idea of a resettlement scheme and procedures for protected 
entry.
65 The EP, in its response to the Commission Communication expressed concern that Regional 
Protection Zones and transit centres would not offer the same level of protection as asylum-seekers 
and refugees might find in the EU. It also warned that TPC might undermine the Geneva 
Convention.
66   
                                                 
55 Tony Blair, Letter to His Excellency Mr Costas Simitis: New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and Protection, 10 March 
2003. 
56 Gregor Noll, "Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones", 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 5, (2004), 303-341. 
57 For an in-depth analysis of these and subsequent proposals: Noll (2004). 
58 On the effects of carrier sanctions and other tools of migration control, see: Nadig (2002); Samers (2004). 
59 For example: Observer, Secret Balkan Camp Built to Hold UK Asylum Seekers, 15 June 2003. 
60 See Madeline Garlick, "The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum?" International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 18,3, (2006), 601-629 on the reaction of Ukraine to the Austrian proposals for extraterritorial efforts to intercept Chechen asylum-
seekers. 
61 UK Government (2003), p.2. 
62 Amnesty International UK/ EU/ UNHCR Unlawful and Unworkable- Amnesty International’s Views on the External Processing of 
Asylum-Seekers (2003). 
63 Noll (2004) p.307. 
64 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament. Towards more accessible, equitable and managed 
asylum systems, 3 June 2003, COM(2003) 315 final. 
65 Garlick (2006); Noll, (2004); Andrew Geddes, "Europe's Border Relationships and International Migration Relations" Journal of Common 
Market Studies 43,4, (2005) 787-806. 
66 European Parliament, Report on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament entitled ‘Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems’, (COM(2003) 315 - C5-0373/2003, 2003/2155(INI). 
  15Yet, Germany subsequently came round to a concept similar to the one originally put forward by the 
UK. In mid-2004, the then Federal Interior Minister, Otto Schily, set out his ideas for the 
establishment of ‘camps’ in North Africa with financial support from the EU.
 67 The rationale behind 
the scheme was ostensibly humanitarian, seeking to prevent asylum-seekers from making the 
dangerous journey to the EU. Prospective migrants would have their claims jointly dealt with in such 
camps. Some of those found to be in need of protection would be offered protection in Europe. Those 
who were found to be undeserving of protection would be provided with information about the 
possible legal channels of immigration to the EU. North African countries would also be offered help 
to repatriate these individuals. Despite backing from his Italian counterpart
68, Schily’s idea met with 
serious misgivings from a number of member states, as well as MEPs and representatives of civil 
society. Above all, there was concern that such policies were merely a means to keep asylum-
applicants from the territory of the EU, where they might be able to activate a fuller range of rights.
69 
MEPs signalled their intention to take the designated Commissioner for JHA, Rocco Buttiglione, to 
task over his support for the project.
70 In particular, the Liberal Group stated their fundamental 
opposition to the proposals.
71
These arguments were played out before a wider audience
72, somewhat unusually for EU asylum 
measures. Despite their careful management of the information released
73, the proponents of external 
processing came in for something of a bruising in the media, as NGOs, MEPs and government 
ministers succeeded in conflict expansion, citing the undesirability of the plan for the EU’s 
humanitarian obligations and its relations with third countries.
74 It is impossible to say to what degree 
this conflict expansion – and the distasteful imagery of camps upon which it played - prevented the 
UK and German governments from recruiting otherwise willing allies to its plans; it does at the very 
least suggest that alterations to the policy-image are possible, even if this is on an ad-hoc basis and 
does not represent a fundamental, and long-lasting shift of the policy-image.
75 The Commission has 
not subsequently shown any great urgency in initiating the study called for in the Hague Programme
76; 
indeed the study has been described as being ‘foreshadowed’ by these political manoeuvrings.
77 It has 
been able to push forward with its own priorities for the external dimension. 
 
IV. Conclusions: The prospects for policy-change under the Hague Programme 
This paper has sought to illustrate the importance of policy-images in explaining both institutional 
change, and actors’ subsequent capacity to exploit the new powers afforded them. It has suggested that 
the lack of a fitting substantive dimension to the policy-image can prevent actors from fully exploiting 
their formal powers (Reception Directive), whilst the presence of a powerful one can have the reverse 
effect (joint external processing). In the specific context of EU asylum policy, the paper also indicated 
that the EP and Commission are struggling to make up the image deficit, and will thus struggle to 
make full use of their formal powers for some little time.  
What, then, are the prospects for policy-change? Various changes have given previously marginalised 
actors an institutional upgrade since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. In asylum policy, 
arrangements laid out in the Nice Treaty (Art.67(5)) accorded the EP co-decision rights alongside the 
Council. The Council’s 2004 decision on the activation of the transition regime
78 did not allow for co-
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  16decision in the area of legal immigration (Article 63(3)(a) TEC) nor on measures regarding rights and 
conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State may 
reside in other Member States (Article 63(4) TEC). Nevertheless, to date, the EP’s rights for 
legislative co-decision do apply for the following measures:  
-  Article 62(2) (b)(ii, iv) on border controls: issuing of visas; rules on a uniform visa 
o  Since 1 April 2005: Article 62(1), (2)(a), (3) on border controls  
-  Article 63(1)(a, b, c) for asylum measures 
-  Article 63(2)(a) for measures on refugees and displaced persons: temporary protection to 
displaced persons from third countries 
o  Since 1 April 2005 and subject to the conditions of the Nice Treaty: Article 63(1)(d) 
for asylum measures: minimum standards for granting or withdrawing refugee status; 
Article 63(2)(b) for promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving 
refugees and displaced persons; and Article 63(3)(b) illegal immigration, illegal 
residence and repatriation of illegal residents 
-  Article 65 judicial cooperation in civil matters (except family law) 
These changes to the institutional balance appear to increase the chances of policy-change, even as the 
policy-image deficit remains. It was also noted above that a favourable institutional position can 
actually improve an actor’s capacity to promote its preferred policy-image. All the same, their 
dominance of the substantive dimension of the asylum policy-image still affords JHA officials in 
Council the opportunity to engage in conflict expansion and mobilise broader political resources 
behind their preferences, even as their formal relationship with the EP has seen a diminution of their 
relative autonomy. 
In the meantime, though, the ‘functional dimension’ of the securitarian asylum policy-image has been 
used to justify a further bout of venue-shopping. Interior ministry actors from Germany and other 
member states are falling back upon a policy-image which highlights the importance of effectiveness 
in migration policy-making in order to shift policy-making to venues more amenable to the realisation 
of their preferences. The mushrooming of groups – ‘G6’, ‘Salzburg’, ‘Pruem’ - in which not all 
member states participate, and from which the Union organs are largely excluded, is indicative of 
renewed efforts at venue-shopping.
79  
Of course, one might argue that these new institutional configurations outside the EC/EU framework 
and thus beyond the supranational parliamentary and judicial supervision that this framework imposes, 
are a perfectly rational response to the security situation in which the member states find themselves, 
as well as to the policy-making constraints imposed on national executives when they were 
cooperating in the EU under conditions of unanimity. It was suggested above, though, that rational and 
suitable solutions are not always matched to problems in the policy-process. In fact, actors may seek 
out problems to justify their preferred solutions. The terrorist attacks on Madrid and London have 
certainly thrown up new security problems related to the management of migration; on the basis of 
past experience it is, however, valid to ask whether the policies currently being drawn up to deal with 
this threat are either suited to the problem at hand or, indeed, are giving sufficient attention to the vast 
array of other problems and opportunities that asylum might throw up. 
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